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NOTES
Attorneys: The Hypocrisy of the Anointed - The Refusal
of the Oklahoma Supreme Court to Extend Antidiscrimi-
nation Laws to Attorneys in Bar Disciplinary Hearings
Prologue - A Hypothetical
Suppose you are an experienced practicing attorney. You are in the middle of a
particularly heated courtroom exchange. Tempers are mounting, and the tension is
high. You feel a little weak, but dismiss it as the normal "butterflies" you
sometimes get in trial.
The opposing counsel makes a statement you find highly inflammatory. You
object, but are overruled. Rage fills your mind. You shout your objection again, and
again are overruled. Slightly dizzy, confused, you begin to scream incoherently.
The judge finds you in contempt and fines you. Feeling nauseous, a cold sweat
covering your body, you sit down. The hearing is soon over, and you stagger out
of the courtroom, wondering what just happened.
A few days later, you collapse and are taken to the emergency room. Subsequent
tests reveal that you have developed diabetes mellitus. The episode you had in the
courtroom was most likely an attack of hypoglycemia related to the diabetic
condition. The stress of the hearing intensified the symptoms.
Several months later, you have largely adjusted to the reality of taking daily
insulin injections to compensate your condition. In fact, you feel better physically
and more alert mentally than you have in a long time. To your surprise, you receive
a summons from the State Bar Association's Disciplinary Board. The judge you
screamed at has recommended you for discipline. Realizing that your conduct was
caused largely by the diabetes, you are confident that the Disciplinary Board will
dismiss the charges when they realize the circumstances. "After all," you think,"my
doctor told me that I probably acted that way because of my diabetes. Now that I
am on insulin injections, there really is little chance that this will happen again.
Surely the Bar won't punish me for something that was beyond my control and
unlikely to happen again?"
Or will it?t
1. See Hoffman v. New York State Bar Ass'n, 343 N.Y.S.2d 994, 996 (App. Div. 1973) (deciding
that attorney's diabetic condition that caused mental lapses during which misconduct occurred was no
defense to disciplinary action).
Symptoms describing onset-diabetes mellitus and accompanying hypoglycemia were drawn from
DAVID E. LARSON, M.D., MAYO CLINIC FAMILY HEALTH BOOK 707-16 (1990). Any medical error in
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In 1993, a psychiatrist diagnosed Michael Busch as having Adult Attention
Deficit Disorder (ADD).' Busch began a program of behavioral and drug therapy.
After diagnoses, Busch continued to struggle with some of the professional respon-
sibilities associated with the practice of law In 1996, he faced disciplinary
proceedings for misconduct which had been committed in 1991 - two years prior
to the diagnoses of, his condition.4 Both the State Bar Association and the
Oklahoma Supreme Court largely ignored Busch's argument that his conduct had
been caused by his disability! Apparently, both the Oklahoma Bar Association and
the Oklahoma Supreme Court believe that the "old ways" are the "good ways" -
just shove people with disabilities off to the side whenever they become incon-
venient or embarrassing rather than deal with the reality of attorneys with
disabilities.6
Introduction
More than forty-three million Americans suffer from some form of mental or
physical disability.' On July 26, 1990, President George Bush signed the Americans
with Disabilities Acte into law, extending federal civil rights protection to those
Americans! For many disabled Americans, this law provided opportunities for
access to restaurants, 0 shopping centers," libraries, and post offices. 3
Discrimination still creates problems for many disabled Americans, however.
While some disabled Americans have found new job opportunities 4 and some
employers have been forced to end discriminatory business practices, 5 change has
this hypothetical, however, is entirely mine.
2. See State ex rcl Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Busch, 919 P.2d 1114, 1115 (Okla. 1996). For a
description of Attention Deficit Disorder, see infra note 64.
3. In 1993 and 1995, Busch was suspended for failure to pay professional dues. In 1994, his dues
were late. In 1995, he was suspended for failure to comply with CLE requirements. See Complainant's
Reply Brief at 7-8, Busch, OBAD No. 1187, SCBD No. 4068 (Dec. 4, 1995).
4. See Busch, 919 P.2d at 1115.
5. See id., 919 P.2d at 1120.
6. This note does not purport to excuse or justify Busch's misconduct. Instead, this note asserts
that the best way to protect the public interest and see that justice is served is to comply with the
mandates of the federal antidiscrimination statutes rather than to ignore them. This note advances the
proposition that both the public interest and the rights of attorneys with disabilities can be enhanced by
changing Oklahoma's policy towards attorneys with disabilities.
7. See 42 U.S.C. ji 12101(1)(a) (1994).
8. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 106-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994)).
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994).
10. See Boston Eatry to Accommodate Disabled, UPI, June 8, 1994, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Arcnws File.
11. See Bush Signs Law on Disabled; Measure Bans Discrimination Against AIDS Patients, Others,
ST. Louis PosT-DisPATCr, July 27, 1990, at 23A.
12. See id.
13. See Barriers Fall Today for the Disabled, THE RECORD (Newark, N.J.), Jan. 26, 1992, at A03.
14. See Connie Farrow, Disabled No Longer Out of Modeling Picture; U.S. Legislation Wakes Firms
Up to Huge Market, Cii. TRIB., May 22, 1994, at 13.
15. See Strip Club's Shower Doesn't Wash with Law, LAS VEGAS REvIEW-JOURNAL, Apr. 22, 1994,
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been slow for them in the workplace. Recent surveys have shown that although
nearly four-fifths of all disabled Americans would like to work, only one-third have
found jobs. 6 Overall, there is a high level of dissatisfaction with the effectiveness
of the Americans with Disabilities Act in opening job opportunities among
individuals with disabilities.'7
The legal profession has been equally slow in adapting to attorneys with
disabilities. While the federal courts have required bar examiners" and bar
application committees'9 to accommodate mentally disabled applicants in testing
procedures and bar application questions, courts have loathed extending those same
protections to practicing attorneys.' State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Busch2'
is another example of the courts refusing to extend attorneys with disabilities the
same protections guaranteed to other Americans.
This note will discuss the applicability of the Americans with Disabilities Act to
the bar disciplinary process. Part I will examine the historical treatment of mental
illness as a defense to attorney disciplinary hearings and the two major laws
providing protection from discrimination to individuals with disabilities. Part II will
recount the facts and holdings of Busch and study the Oklahoma Supreme Court's
decision in light of precedent. Part II proposes a plan for extending the Americans
with Disabilities Act protections to attorneys in bar disciplinary hearings while
citing potential benefits and shortcomings. Finally, this note urges the Oklahoma
Supreme Court and the Oklahoma Bar Association to adopt policies providing
protection to attorneys with mental disabilities.
at 17A.
16. See Survey: Many Disabled Jobless, AP, May 27, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
ARCNWS File.
17. See, e.g., Transit Service for Disabled Is Not Fulfilling Its Obligations, FORT LAUDERDALE SUN-
SENTINEL, June 22, 1996, Editorial Section, at IA; Tim Bryant, Law-Aiding Disabled Under Fire; Some
Fear Congress Will Water Down ADA, ST. Louis POsT-DIsPATcH, Dec. 24, 1995, at 1A; Kim Norris,
Rights Law Falls Short of Target, Critics Say, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, June 19, 1995, Business Section,
at 10; Mary Kane, Disabilities Act Stirs Paranoia in Workplace; Handling Mental Troubles Vexes Bosses
and Employees, May 29, 1995, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEws (Denver), at 37A; Jay Mathews, Disabilities
Act Failing to Achieve Workplace Goals; Landmark Law Rarely Helps Disabled People Seeking Jobs,
WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 1995, § A; see also Ron A. Vassel, Note, The Americans With Disabilities Act:
The Cost, Uncertainty and Inefficiency, 13 J.L. & CoM. 397, 410 (1994) (arguing that ADA is
burdensome and ineffective).
18. See, e.g., D'Amico v. New York State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 813 F. Supp. 217, 223 (W.D.N.Y.
1993) (requiring New York Board of Law Examiners to make reasonable accommodations for disabled
plaintiff during bar examination).
19. See, e.g., Clark v. Virginia Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 880 F. Supp. 430, 431 (E.D. Va. 1995) (ruling
certain questions about mental health on bar application too broad). See generally Phyllis Coleman &
Ronald A. Shellow, Ask About Conduct, Not Mental Illness: A Proposal for Bar Examiners and Medical
Boards to Comply with the ADA and the Constitution, 20 J. LEGIs. 147 (1994).
20. See, e.g., Doe v. Attorney Discipline Bd., No. 95-1259, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 5727, at *8 (6th
Cir. Feb. 22, 1996) (per curiam).
21. 919 P.2d 1114 (Okla. 1996).
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I. Background Information
A. Historical Treatment of Mental Illness as a Defense in Attorney Discipline
Hearings
The impact of mental illness as a factor in disciplinary proceedings has been
wildly unpredictable." In some cases, courts essentially ignore mental illness as
a factor in attorney disciplinary proceedings," while in others it serves to exonerate
an attorney's misconduct.'
Historically, mental illness has not provided a viable defense in attorney
disciplinary hearings." This is true even in cases where the misconduct was the
product of a mental illness." Courts find this policy appropriate because the
primary goal of disciplinary cases is to protect the public."
Mental illness can serve to mitigate the severity of bar discipline.' Mitigating
circumstances can reduce a penalty of disbarment to suspension29 or reduce the
duration of a suspension.' However, few states will consider mitigating cir-
cumstances where am attorney has misappropriated client funds."
B. Federal Disability Antidiscrimination Laws: The Rehabilitation Act of 1973
and the Americans with Disabilities Act
The first comprehensive statute designed to protect the civil rights of the disabled
22. For a broad di-;cussion about the use of mental illness as a defense in attorney discipline
hearings, see generally Gregory G. Samo, Annotation, Mental or Emotional Disturbance as a Defense
to or Mitigation of Charges Against Attorney in Disciplinary Proceeding, 26 A.L.R.4TH 995 (1983).
23. "The insanity of a respondent does not foreclose bar discipline...." In re Hoover, 745 P.2d
939, 946 (Ariz. 1987) (attorney with bipolar disorder cannot avoid discipline because disorder made him
incapable of comprehending the nature of his acts).
24. See In re Mclndon, 845 P.2d 1006, 1012-13 (Wash. 1993) (holding that attorney's bipolar
disorder, following treatment, was a mitigating factor reducing disbarment sanction to a two year
suspension, with credit granted for time license was inactive).
25. See Ioffman v. New York State Bar Ass'n, 343 N.Y.S.2d 994, 996 (App. Div. 1973) (deciding
that attorney's physical illness that caused mental lapses during which misconduct occurred was no
defense to disciplinary action).
26. See Hoover, 745 P.2d at 946.
27. See Carter v. G~nella, 526 A.2d 1279, 1280 (R.I. 1987) ("[IThe primary goal in disciplinary
proceedings is to protect the public.") (quoting Committee of Prof. Ethics & Conduct of the Bar Ass'n
v. Silver, 395 N.W.2d 877, 879 (Iowa 1986)); see also In re Rivikind, 791 P.2d 1037, 1042 (Ariz. 1990)
(defining goal of disciplinary proceedings as to protect public and deter similar conduct from other
attorneys, not to punish individual attorneys).
28. See Hoover, 745 P.2d at 945-46.
29. See Rose v. State Bar, 779 P.2d 761,773-74 (Cal. 1989) (holding that attorney's mental disorder
was mitigating factor which reduced trial panel's recommendation of disbarment to suspension).
30. See In re Peek, 565 A.2d 627, 631 (D.C. 1989) (suspending attorney whose misconduct was
caused by mental illness for two months rather than four months).
31. See In re Wilsor, 409 A.2d 1153, 1154 (N.J. 1979) (stating generally that in all cases where an
attorney knowingly misappropriates client funds, the attorney should be disbarred). But see In re Couser,
596 P.2d 26, 28 (Ariz. 1979) (pointing out that misappropriation of client funds generally warrants
disbarment absent extenuating circumstances).
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was the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.32 Congress intended the Act to develop and
implement programs providing vocational training and to otherwise promote the
independent living of disabled individuals.33 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act contained the most sweeping civil rights provisions of the Act, prohibiting any
program or activity receiving federal financial assistance from discriminating against
a person based upon that person's disability3
The Act did not intend to insulate disabled employees from disciplinary actions
that would be brought against any nondisabled employee.' In fact, an employee
whose disability prevents him from being "otherwise qualified"37 may not be able
to take advantage of the Act's protection." Courts have interpreted this to mean
that an alcoholic whose misconduct is a result of his current alcohol usage39 or a
doctor suffering from bipolar disorder yet refusing to admit that he ever had any
mental problemse could not seek protection under the Act because they were not
otherwise qualified.
Congress designed the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990V' (ADA) to
provide strong antidiscrimination protection for persons with disabilities.4 The
ADA sets forth antidiscrimination laws for employment,43 for access to public
32. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797b (1994)).
33. See 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1994).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
35. The section reads in pertinent part:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States ... shall, solely
by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive
agency or by the United States Postal Service.
Id. For a further discussion of the effects of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, see generally U.S. COMM'N
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES 47-56 (1983) (discussing
ramifications of Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and other related disabilities legislation).
36. See Wilber v. Brady, 780 F. Supp. 837, 840 (D.D.C. 1992) (finding that alcoholic who killed
person while driving under the influence of alcohol was fired for conduct, not disability, and is therefore
not entitled to protection of Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
37. For a full discussion of who is a "qualified" individual with a handicap under the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, see generally Colleen R. Courtade, Annotation, Who Is 'Qualified' Handicapped Person
Protected from Employment Discrimination Under Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 USCS §§ 701 et. seq.)
and Regulations Promulgated Thereunder, 80 A.L.R. FED. 380 (1986).
38. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 405 (1979) (holding that Act
"requires only that an 'otherwise qualified handicapped individual' not be excluded from participating in
a federally funded program 'solely by reason of his handicap"').
39. See Gonzalez v. California State Personnel Bd., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 282, 286 (Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that employee's discharge was related to current use of alcohol, not his general alcoholism, and
therefore not protected by Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
40. See Ramachandar v. Sobol, 838 F. Supp. 100, 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that reasonable
accommodations for medical professionals did not require professional licensing authorities to gamble
with the public health).
41. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994)).
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (1994).
43. See id. §§ 12111-12117.
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services," and for public accommodations and services operated by private
entities.4 The rights guaranteed by existing federal statutes, including the
Rehabilitation Act, wnd existing case law on these issues are still effective; the ADA
simply broadens the scope of the protection offered under these laws and
occasionally expands their power.'
The employment and government programs portions of the ADA protects
individuals with disabilities who, with or without reasonable accommodations, are
"otherwise qualified" to perform the job or participate in or receive the benefits of
a government program or service47 The law also excludes certain "disabilities"
from coverage.' Finally, the ADA does not extend protection to individuals who
are not "otherwise qualified. 49
IL State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Busch
A. Facts
Connie Bateman retained J. Michael Busch for representation in a medical
malpractice suit.' The suit alleged that the doctor who delivered Bateman's adult
daughter had been negligent in the delivery and that this negligence caused the
daughter to suffer various physical and mental disabilities." In November 1989,
the court granted Bateman a default judgment for ten million dollars."'
Busch conducted a brief investigation to determine the doctor's assets, then sent
the doctor a letter stating that he would not seek to execute on any of the doctor's
personal assets, but would simply collect from any insurance proceeds available.'
Bateman did not consent to this arrangement or to the letter being sent.' Subse-
quently, Busch discovered that the doctor's insurance policy was not in force at the
time the negligent acts occurred.'5 The trial court held the letter to be a valid
44. See id. §§ 1213-12165.
45. See id. §§ 1218T.-12189.
46. See AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, THE AMERICANS WITH DIsABILIES ACT MANUAL: STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES, EMPLOYMENT, AND PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS 4 (John Parry, ed.,
1992).
47. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111, 12132 (1994).
48. Excluded "disabilities" include: sexually deviant behavior (homosexuality, bisexuality,
transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity disorders not resulting
from physical impairments, or other sexual behavior disorders); compulsive behavior (gambling,
kleptomania, or pyromania); and psychoactive substance use disorders which are the product of current
illegal drug usage. See ri. § 12211(b).
49. See supra notes 38-40.
50. See State ex reL Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Busch, 919 P.2d 1114, 1115 (Okla. 1996).
51. See id.
52. See i.
53. See id. Busch lelieved the doctor had few personal assets and was covered by malpractice
insurance.
54. See id.
55. See i.d Upon subsequent investigation, Busch discovered that the doctor had substantial personal
assets including a ranch, multiple bank accounts, and an antique car collection.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol49/iss4/6
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covenant not to execute and barred recovery on the doctor's personal assets.'
Bateman told Busch to file an appeal of the ruling, but Busch never did so.'
Busch then sued the hospital that had employed the doctor. The trial court
granted summary judgment to the hospital. Busch filed an appeal of the summary
judgment one day too late; the Oklahoma Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as
out of time."
In February 1993, Busch appeared before a district judge for a hearing on the
enforceability of the covenant not to execute.' The judge specifically asked about
the status of the suit against the hospital. Although the Oklahoma Supreme Court
had dismissed the appeal as out of time, Busch told the judge that the appeal was
pending and should be resolved shortly.'
The Oklahoma Bar Association received a complaint against Busch for his
handling of the Bateman cases.6' A trial panel of the Oklahoma Bar Association
convened to hear the case and make recommendations to the Oklahoma Supreme
Court.' The Complaint lodged with the trial panel alleged Busch committed six
counts of misconduct.' Busch testified that a psychiatrist had diagnosed him with
ADD' in June and July 1993Y The psychiatrist presented expert testimony
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id. Busch also mislead his client concerning the status of her appeal.
61. See id. This was not the first time a grievance had been filed against Busch for his handling of
a case. In 1992, Busch was publicly reprimanded for failure to communicate with his clients in at least
two cases. The Oklahoma Bar Association also reprimanded Busch for violating the mandatory response
provisions of the Oklahoma Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings. See State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar
Ass'n v. Busch, 832 P.2d 845, 846-47 (Okla. 1992). In 1993, Busch misled a client and unreasonably
delayed paying a consulting physician in a related case. See State ex reL Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Busch,
853 P.2d 194 (Okla. 1993). Busch was suspended for ninety days and placed on one year's probation
with the stipulation that during the probation he would have to work with Lawyers Helping Lawyers
throughout his probation. See idt at 197. Presumably, Bateman filed the complaint at bar, however, the
record is unclear on that point.
62. Pursuant to Rule 6 of the Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings. See 5 OKLA. STAT. ch.
I, app. I-A (Supp. 1996).
63. See Busch, 919 P.2d at 1115 n.1. The charges were as follows: Count I alleged misconduct by
sending the letter agreeing not to pursue the doctor's personal assets; Count II alleged misconduct by
failing to appeal the district court's ruling concerning the letter, Count III alleged misconduct for failing
to keep Bateman informed as to the status of her case; Count IV alleged misconduct for failing to appeal
the summary judgment in favor of the hospital on a timely basis; Count V alleged misconduct for failing
to inform Bateman that the hospital case had been dismissed; Count VI alleged misconduct for making
an intentional misrepresentation to the court. See id.
64. Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD) is essentially "a persistent pattern of inattention and/or
hyperactivity-impulsivity that is more frequent and severe than is typically observed in individuals at a
comparable level of development." AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 78 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV]. The disorder is not new -
psychiatrists first recognized it nearly a hundred years ago. Originally, ADD was diagnosed as a
childhood disorder occurring in 3% to 5% of the population. See Edward M. Hallowell, M.D. & John
J. Ratey, M.D., DRIVEN TO DISTRACTION: RECOGNIZING AND COPING wrTH ATTENTION DEFICIT
DISORDER FROM CHILDHOOD THROUGH ADULTHOOD 12 (1994). Experts now believe as many as 50%
1996]
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regarding Busch's condition to the trial panel.' The trial panel concluded that
Busch had committed professional misconduct on all six counts of the Complaint,
but that two of the counts were related to Busch's ADD.' The trial panel
recommended that the Oklahoma Supreme Court suspend Busch for two years, then
readmit him subject to the conditions proposed by the expert psychiatrist's letter of
August 1, 1995.'
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma reviewed the trial panel's findings de novo.'
The respondent, Michael Busch, argued that the trial panel erred because it refused
to make a reasonable accommodation for his disability as mandated by the
Americans with Disabilities Act.7 The court considered two issues on review: (1)
whether the ADA applies to the Bar Association in general and to attorney
disciplinary proceedings in particular and (2) whether the provisions of the ADA
prohibit sanctioning an attorney whose misconduct arises from his disability. 2 The
court held that while the ADA does apply to the Bar Association and related
disciplinary proceedings,' it does not necessarily prohibit sanctioning an attorney's
misconduct, even if the misconduct arises from the attorney's mental illness.'
B. Analysis of the Court's Reasoning
Busch contended that the disciplinary panel should have followed the laws and
regulations set forth by the ADA. The respondent presented two arguments in
support of his position. First, the respondent claimed that the ADA applied to bar
disciplinary hearings.75 Second, the respondent asserted that, as an individual with
of children who are diagnosed with the disorder will continue to have symptoms in adolescence and
adulthood. See H. Russell Searight et al., Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder: Assessment, Diagnosis
and Management, 40 J. FAM. PRAc. 270 (1995), available in LEXIS, News Library (discussing the
revised criteria for diagnosis presented in DSM-IV, supra).
In adults, symptoms of hyperactivity often manifest as restlessness and difficulty in pursuing sedentary
activities. Impulsivity rmty occur in the form of inappropriate social activities (talking out of turn, failing
to listen to directions, or initiating conversations at inappropriate times) and may lead to the pursuit of
potentially dangerous acivities without regard to the consequences. See DSM-IV, supra, at 79.
65. See Busch, 919 P.2d at 1115. Note that Dr. Dodson diagnosed Busch during the 1993
disciplinary suspension. See infra note 66.
66. See Busch, 919 P.2d at 1116. Busch's expert, Dr. William W. Dodson, M.D., submitted a
complete report as to Bufch's condition in August 1995. Supplement to the Record at 4-6, Busch (OBAD
No. 1187; SCBD No. 4C68). Additionally, at the request of the trial panel, Dr. Dodson submitted a
written proposal of a prcgram designed to help attorneys with problems similar to Busch's. See Busch,
919 P.2d at 1116.
67. See Busch, 919 P.2d at 1116. The trial panel found that counts two and four, see supra note 63,
were related to Busch's ADD. See Busch, 919 P.2d at 1116.
68. See supra note 156.
69. In Oklahoma, the supreme court reviews all attorney disciplinary hearings de novo. See State
ex rel. Oklahoma Bar As'n v. Kessler, 818 P.2d 463, 466 (Okla. 1991).
70. See Busch, 919 P.2d at 1116-17.
71. See id. at 1117.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 1119.
74. See id. at 1119-20.
75. See id. at 1116-17.
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a disability recognized by the ADA, he was entitled to a "reasonable accom-
modation" for his disability and that the suspension of his license was not a
"reasonable accommodation."'7 Judge Summers, writing for the court, sustained the
respondent's first contention but rejected the second.
1. Authority of the Court to Regulate the Legal Profession
The Oklahoma Supreme Court noted its broad authority to regulate the legal
profession, referring to Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners.' In Schware, the
New Mexico State Bar Association denied an applicant to the New Mexico State
Bar permission to take the bar examination because he lacked "moral character."78
The United States Supreme Court held that, while a state can set high standards for
bar applicants, those standards must bear a rational connection to the applicant's
ability to practice law.7 In a concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter noted that
"[riefusal to allow a man to qualify himself for the profession on a wholly arbitrary
standard or on a consideration that offends the dictates of reason offends the Due
Process Clause.""0
The Schware decision, while largely supportive of the power of state courts to
regulate the legal profession, set forth an important rule limiting that power: the
"rational connection test."'" In other words, to deny a person the opportunity to
enter the legal profession, the state must show some "rational connection" between
the reason that a person is denied the opportunity to practice and that person's
fitness or capacity to practice law.' Applying this standard to the Busch case, the
court must show some rational connection between Busch's mental disability and his
inability to practice law.
Other restrictions have been placed on the states' ability to regulate the legal
profession. For example, in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,' a husband and wife
sued the Virginia State Bar alleging violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act,.
stemming from the State Bar setting minimum fees for legal services." The State
Bar also issued ethical opinions indicating that failure to follow the fee schedule
76. See id. -at 1117.
77. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
78. See id. at 234-35. The Board of Bar Examiners determined Schware lacked moral character
because he had once belonged to the Communist Party, had been arrested (but never convicted of any
crime), and had used aliases. These charges centered on admissions Schware made on his application
as well as on confidential information forwarded to the Bar Examiners. The events in question occurred
at least fifteen years prior to Schware's application to the Bar. See i. at 234.
79. See id. at 239.
80. aI. at 249 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 239. The court noted that, for example, a person could not be denied the opportunity to
take the bar examination because he was black or belonged to a certain mainstream political party. See
id.
82. See id.
83. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
84. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-36 (1994).
85. See Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 776.
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could result in disciplinary action.' Petitioners, who sought legal services to close
a real estate transaction, argued this practice amounted to price fixing and was
therefore illegal under the Sherman Act.'
Respondent, the Virginia State Bar, defended its right to regulate prices in the
legal profession by claiming, in part, that Congress did not intend for the Sherman
Act to apply to the legal profession.' However, the respondents were unable to
provide any specific legislative history or statutory authority supporting this
contention." The Court, while noting the traditional power of states to regulate the
legal profession, rejected this argument, pointing out "Congress intended to strike
as broadly as it could in [section 1] of the Sherman Act and to read into it so wide
an exemption as that urged [by respondent] . . . would be at odds with that
purpose."' The Court mentioned, in dicta, that it "did not intend [any] diminution
of the authority of the State to regulate its professions."'"
Thus, as noted above, while a state supreme court has broad powers to regulate
the legal profession, it may not set standards that have no relation to the candidate's
ability or capacity to practice law, and may not ignore relevant federal laws and
regulations. The standards should be designed to protect the public and the integrity
of the bar, but mu;t be within certain limitations.
2. Applicability of the ADA to Bar Association Proceedings
Courts first addressed the applicability of the ADA to state bar associations in
cases involving either application for admission to the bar' or accommodations for
taking the bar examination.' In both instances, courts forced bar examiners and
bar application committees to adopt policies consistent with the mandates of the
ADA.
The ADA prohibits discrimination by reasons of disability against any disabled
person who is "otherwise qualified" to participate in or receive the benefits of a
government program or serviceY The regulations governing the ADA prohibit a
public entity" from directly or indirectly using any standard that would "have the
effect of subjecting qualified individuals with disabilities to discrimination on the
86. See i. at 777.
87. See i. at 778.
88. See id. at 786.
89. See id.
90. Id. at 787.
91. Id. at 793.
92. See generally John D. McKenna, Note, Is the Mental Health of Bar Applicants a Legitimate
Concern of State Professional Licensing Boards? The Americans With Disabilities Act vs. State
Professional Licensing Boards, 12 HOFSTRA LAB. L. 335 (1995).
93. See generally Francis P. Morrissey, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Disabling of the
Bar Examination Process?, THE BAR EXAMINER, May 1993, at 9.
94. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994).
95. See 28 C.F.R. C, 35.104 (1995). "Public entity means (1) any State or local government; (2) Any
department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local
government; and (3) The National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and any commuter authority (as
defined in section 103(8) of the Rail Passenger Service Act)." Id.
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basis of disability."9 Furthermore, a public entity may not administer or maintain
a licensing or certification program that discriminates against or excludes a person
because of a disability?" The ADA also requires that a public entity make
reasonable modifications to its practices or policies to accommodate persons with
disabilities.98 Exceptions to this requirement exist in cases where no reasonable
accommodation can be made or when the accommodation or modification would
fundamentally alter the nature of the program.'
A Delaware case, In re Rubenstein,"3 held that the ADA applied to bar
examiners. In Rubenstein, the petitioner, who had a learning disability, requested
additional time to take the bar examination. The Board of Bar Examiners granted
her additional time on only part of the test. Subsequently, the petitioner passed the
portion with which additional time was granted but failed the remainder of the
examination.'
The court applied the regulations accompanying the ADA and determined that the
bar examiners, while correct in granting additional time for one portion of the bar
examination, had unreasonably denied petitioner time for the remainder of the
examination."'° The court held that "the board's decision to deny [petitioner]
additional time ... is inconsistent with ... the ADA regulations ...."3
A similar result occurs when bar applications ask applicants broad questions
concerning an applicant's history of mental or emotional disorders."3 Bar
application questions concerning an applicant's mental health must have some
connection to the ability to practice law; otherwise, the question violates the ADA.
Similarly, bar members who apply for a judicial position may not be required to
divulge mental health information that bears no connection to the ability to perform
the duties of a judge."5
Here, the Oklahoma Supreme Court did not directly address a key issue. The
court stated that the ADA clearly applied to the Oklahoma Bar Association as an
arm of the Oklahoma Supreme Court, but then held that the ADA "does not prevent
this Court from sanctioning [an attorney]."'"° Citing extensively to Florida Bar v.
Clement, 7 the Busch court inferred that an attorney who committed serious
misconduct was "not otherwise qualified" under the ADA."3 Furthermore, the
96. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(3)(I) (1995).
97. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(6) (1995).
98. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (1995).
99. See id.
100. 637 A.2d 1131 (Del. 1994).
101. See id. at 1133-34.
102. See id. at 1139. The court approved, for example, the bar association requirement that
Rubenstein present evidence that she had a disability requiring accommodations.
103. See id.
104. See Morrissey, supra note 93.
105. See Doe v. Judicial Nominating Commn, 906 F. Supp. 1534, 1536-37 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (holding
that questions asked of candidates for judicial position were overly broad and in violation of ADA).
106. Busch, 919 P.2d at 1118 (quoting Florida Bar v. Clement, 662 So. 2d 690, 700 (Fla. 1995)).
107. 662 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 1995).
108. See Busch, 919 P.2d at 1118.
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court determined that where an attorney commits serious misconduct, no reasonable
accommodations a:-e possible."°
This analysis flies in the face of the mandates of the ADA."' The ADA
prohibits a governmental entity from denying an individual with a disability the
right to participate in or gain benefits from a government program if he is otherwise
qualified with or without reasonable accommodations for his disability.", The
Oklahoma Supreme Court should have taken note as to whether Busch had
continued to commit acts of misconduct after being diagnosed, and whether he was
capable, with or without a reasonable accommodation, of continuing to practice law.
3. Impact of the ADA to the Imposition of Discipline
Finally, the court considered whether the ADA prohibits the imposition of bar
discipline. The court relied heavily on the decision in Florida Bar v. Clement"'
to decide how cou-ts should evaluate ADA claims in bar disciplinary hearings.'
In Clement, the Florida Bar Association recommended the Florida Supreme Court
impose sanctions on an attorney who misappropriated funds from two clients."4
The attorney claimed that his actions were the result of his mental disorder and that
the recommended discipline violated the ADA."5 The Florida Supreme Court
rejected the attorney's ADA claims and ordered his disbarment."6
The court based its decision on two factors. First, the court pointed out that at
least some of Clement's conduct was not the result of his mental disorder."7 The
court held that a causal connection between the attorney's mental illness and the
alleged misconduct must exist for an attorney to invoke a claim under the ADA."'
Second, the Florida Supreme Court indicated that the ADA might not bar
discipline even if the misconduct did result from an attorney's mental illness."'
The court based its reasoning on its interpretation of the rules regulating the
ADA. The court interpreted the regulation to mean that if no reasonable
109. See id. at 1119.
110. See supra notes 42-49.
111. See supra note 37. Obviously, given Busch's history, the court would likely have reached the
same conclusion. However, that is not and will not necessarily be true in every case.
112. 662 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 1995).
113. See Busch, 919 P.2d at 1118.
114. See Clement, 662 So. 2d at 692.
115. See id at 699.
116. Seeid at 700.
117. See id. The court noted that Clement's psychiatrist claimed the attorney was incapable of
distinguishing right fromn wrong, but that his contention was rejected by the disciplinary referee. The
court also noted that on at least one occasion, the attorney was not emotionally impaired when he
misused client funds. See id. at 699-700.
118. See id. at 700 (citing People v. Goldstein, 887 P.2d 634, 638 n.2 (Colo. 1994) (attorney's
mental illness was not a direct cause of misconduct; therefore disciplinary measures would not violate
the ADA)).
119. See Clement, 662 So. 2d at 700.
120. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (1996). A person is a qualified individual with a disability with respect
to licensing if he or she, with or without reasonable modifications, "meets the essential requirements"
for receiving a license. See id
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modification of the rules regulating the legal profession is possible, the ADA does
not prevent exclusion from a government program or activity.'21 This decision
parallels similar disciplinary decisions governed by the ADA and the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973.'
The Oklahoma Supreme Court referred to In re Wolfgram' to determine
whether the ADA covers an individual with a disability. The Wolfgram case
involved an attorney being forced into "involuntary inactive" status because of his
mental illness.2 The attorney claimed that placing him on involuntary inactive
status violated the ADA.'"
The Wolfgram court concluded that an attorney who was not otherwise qualified
could not invoke the protection of the ADA in a bar disciplinary hearing."3 The
justices held that, since the evidence presented showed that the attorney was not
capable of consistently and effectively practicing law without the threat of harm to
his clients or the public, he was not otherwise qualified to practice law.' The
ADA does not require a court to allow an attorney to practice law when doing so
poses a substantial risk to clients and the public at large."
The Oklahoma Supreme Court's analysis of these cases led it to conclude that the
ADA did not prohibit disciplining an attorney with a disability.' While this is
true to a certain extent, the prior cases suggest that some reasoning and analysis of
the threat the attorney poses to the general public is necessary, particularly in cases
where most or all of the attorney's misconduct arose from a mental disability.' 3
Rather than objectively applying the conclusions of law from similar cases,
however, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reverted to its traditional practice of
considering mental illness only as a mitigating factor in attorney discipline cases.''
The court determined that its duty to protect the integrity of the bar and public
confidence in practicing attorneys superseded any duties set forth by the ADA.
32
In fear of "shirking its duty as the guardians of the state's bar,"'33 the Oklahoma
Supreme Court presented a policy blatantly discriminatory to individuals with
disabilities.
121. See Clement, 662 So. 2d at 700.
122. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397,412-13 (1979); see also Stillwell
v. Kansas City, Mo. Bd. of Police Comm'rs, 872 F. Supp. 682, 685 (W.D. Mo. 1995) (holding automatic
decision to deny private security guard license to one-handed man, without showing that he is not
"otherwise qualified" to perform necessary job duties, violated the ADA).
123. In re Wolfgram, No. 90-TT-16955, 1995 WL 506002 (Cal. Bar Ct. 1995).
124. See Wolfgram, 1995 WL 506002, at *1.
125. See id.
126. See id. at *7.
127. See id.
.128. See id.
129. See State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Busch, 919 P.2d 1114, 1119-20 (Okla. 1996).
130. See supra notes 112-28 and accompanying text.
131. See Busch, 919 P.2d at 1120.
132. See id.
133. Id.
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III. A Plan for Incorporating the ADA in Bar Discipline Actions
A. Policy Analysis of Status Quo
Most state courts are in fact reluctant to afford any legitimacy to mental defenses
of bar discipline actions." This practice continues because of the court's desire
to protect the integrity of the bar and members of the public from attorneys deemed
unfit to practice law.35 Until recently, these concerns allowed state bar as-
sociations to ask broad and irrelevant questions about the mental health backgrounds
of bar applicants."' It would be illogical to suggest that the ADA may serve to
protect these individuals and yet cannot provide protection to attorneys whose
mental illness has caused them to commit acts of misconduct.
The decision in Clement suggests a three part test to determine the applicability
of the ADA to professional disciplinary actions. First, does the professional suffer
from a disability covered under the ADA? 37 Second, does the alleged misconduct
arise from the covered disability?' Finally, can any reasonable modifications be
made to the licensing that would allow the professional to meet the essential
requirements for receiving or maintaining the license.'39
To comply fully with the ADA, a court reviewing a professional disciplinary
hearing should make its determinations based on the first two portions of this test.
If some or all of the misconduct is the result of mental illness, the court should
modify its normal disciplinary rules to safeguard the civil rights of disabled
attorneys as well as the interests of the bar and of the public. The third prong of the
test should be analyzed with the requirements of the ADA in mind.
Some courts have argued that they already account for the disciplined attorney's
disability because the disability may mitigate any disciplinary action." However,
in the overwhelming majority of these instances, the attorney still faces punishment
for misconduct he may have had no control over. 4' The current approach has
other problems as well. It leads to inconsistent rulings"" and unnecessarily drives
individuals who may overcome their disability and be productive attorneys out of
the profession."3
134. See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
135. See In re Wc'lfgram, No. 90-TT-16955, 1995 WL 506002, at *7 (Cal. Bar Ct. 1995).
136. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
137. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994). "The term 'disability' means, with respect to an individual -
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." Id.
138. See, e.g., supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
139. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (1996).
140. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
141. See In re Hoaver, 745 P.2d 939, 946 (Ariz. 1987).
142. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., In re McLendon, 845 P.2d 1006, 1012-13 (Wash. 1993).
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B. Proposed ADA Plan
Any new plan for addressing mental illness in attorney discipline proceedings
should be modeled as much as possible on existing rules and procedures. This will
not only make creation of the ADA plan easier but will also provide an existing
framework of court decisions and interpretations. The modifications must also serve
to protect the public interests and preserve the integrity of the bar.'"
One possible method of accomplishing these goals while preserving the rights of
disabled attorneys is suggested by rules adopted in nineteen states. These address
treatment of mentally incapacitated attorneys.' The rules call for mentally
disabled or incompetent attorneys to be placed on "disability inactive" status. Courts
and bar associations may easily modify these rules to conform to ADA guidelines.
An examination of the Colorado Court Rules'" is useful for understanding this
system. In Colorado, an attorney who is unable to perform his professional
responsibilities is placed on disability inactive status. 47 The court may transfer an
attorney to disability inactive status if a court has declared the attorney incompetent,
if the attorney is involuntarily committed to a mental hospital, if the attorney has
voluntarily petitioned for a guardian, or if the attorney has been declared not guilty
by reason of insanity in a criminal action.'" Furthermore, an interested party may
petition the Colorado Supreme Court to investigate whether an attorney is incapable
of continuing to practice law due to mental or emotional disability or addiction to
drugs or alcohol.' The court may require the attorney to undergo physical or
mental evaluations and must grant the attorney the opportunity to show why such
examinations are unnecessary as well as the opportunity to defend against the
charges."u Finally, if an attorney seeks to defend a professional misconduct case
on the grounds of disability or addiction, the misconduct hearing is immediately
suspended, and the attorney is ordered to undergo a medical examination.'' In all
these hearings, the burden of proof is placed upon the party seeking to transfer the
144. See State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Busch, 919 P.2d 1114, 1119 (Okla. 1996).
145. Nineteen states have adopted some form of "disability inactive" rules. See ALA. R. Disc. P.
27; ALASKA R. BAR 30; ARiz. Rav. STAT. ANN. SUP. Cr. R. 59 (1988 & Supp. 1996); ARK. PROF.
CONDUCT PRoc. § 7; CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6007(a); COLO. R. Civ. P. 241.19; HAW. R. Sup. Cr.
2.19; ILL. Sup. Cr. R. 758; 1995 KAN. Cr. R. ANNOT. 220; MINN R. PROF. Rasp. 28; NEv. Sup. Cr. R.
117; N.J. R. GEN. App. 1:20-12(a); PA. R. Disc. ENF. 301; R.I. Sup. Cr. R. art. III, Rule 17; S.C. R. App.
CT. 413, 19; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 16-19-48 (1995); TENN. R. Sup. Cr. 9, § 21.1; WASH. R.L.D.
10.2; Wyo. R. Disc. CODE XVII. All of these state rules are available in LEXIS, States Library, Allcde
File.
146. COLO. R. Civ. P. 241.19 (1995). Although no two states' Rules for Professional Conduct are
identical, the Colorado rule is typical of states employing a "disability inactive" system.
147. See COLO. R. Civ. P. 241.19(a) (1995).
148. See id. Rule 241.19(b).
149. See id. Rule 241.19(c).
150. See id.
151. See id. Rule 241.19(d).
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attorney to disability inactive status. Clear and convincing evidence is required to
transfer the attorney to disability inactive status."'
Disability hearings are not considered disciplinary hearings,' and, by their very
nature, abide by the mandates of the ADA." An attorney who is placed on the
disability inactive status has been ruled "not otherwise qualified" by the court and
therefore not protected by the ADA. The Wolfgram case involves the application
of the ADA to just such a plan. 5' In Wolfgram, the State Bar Court of California
ruled that an attorney who is placed on disability inactive status may not use the
protections afforded by the ADA because he was not an "otherwise qualified"
individual and therefore was not within the class protected by the Act." The court
noted, however, that "if at any time respondent can show that there is no longer a
basis for this inactive enrollment, he may file an application ... for transfer to
active status."'"
Many states curently use programs such as Lawyers Helping Lawyers' or
require periodic contact with the state bar by the attorney or his physician or
psychiatrist during periods of probation.59 These practices should continue as they
provide an additional safeguard for the general public. Additionally, many states'
rules of conduct require a judge or attorney to report professional misconduct,
including cases where an attorney may be unfit to practice law."6 If attorneys will
152. See id. Rule 241.19(e).
153. See id Rule 241.19(a).
154. See 28 C.F.R § 35.130(b)(7)-(b)(8) (1996) (allowing public entities to refrain from making
program modifications or to set eligibility criteria that screen out a disabled individual if imposing the
modification would "ftndamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity" or if the
eligibility criteria are "recessary for the provision of the service, program, or activity being offered").
While arbitrarily suspending an attorney's license for some misconduct arising from placing an
attorney on disability inactive status until the illness no longer affects the attorney's ability to practice
law would be exactly fle "modification" or "eligibility criteria" the regulations require.
155. See discussion of Volfgram supra notes 123-28 and accompanying text.
156. See Wolfgram, 1995 WL 506002, at *6. The court examined several employment discharge
cases to reach its conchion, including, Tyndall v. National Educ. Ctrs., 31 F.3d 209,214 (4th Cir. 1994)
(employee's disability prevented her from meeting essential job requirements despite accommodations);
Reigel v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, 859 F. Supp. 963 (E.D.N.C. 1994) (shoulder injury and mental
fitness made doctor unale to perform essential job functions); and Larkins v. CIBA Vision Corp., 858
F. Supp. 1572 (N.D. GaL 1994) (customer service representative who had frequent panic attacks was
unable to complete essential job functions despite accommodations). Note that these cases involved suits
brought against employers under Title I of the ADA. See supra note 37.
157. Wolfgram, 1995 WL 506002, at *7.
158. Lawyers Helping Lawyers is a confidential program provided by the Oklahoma Bar
Association. The program is designed to help members who are having personal troubles that adversely
affect their practice. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION, LAWYERS HELPING LAWYERS: AN OKLAHOMA BAR
ASSOCIATION PROJEcT FOR REFERRAL OF ATTORNEYS IN NEED OF ASSISTANCE 2, available from
Oklahoma Bar Association. The rule governing the "Lawyers Helping Lawyers" program is codified at
5 OKLA. STAT. ch. 1, app. I-A, Rule 5.3(f) (Supp. 1996).
159. See, e.g., State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Busch, 919 P.2d 1114, 1120 (Okla. 1996).
160. See, e.g., IMOEEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3(a) (1996) (reading, in part: "A
lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a
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police the profession, and if failure to do so could be a violation of ethical rules of
conduct, then the public and the bar will be protected by early detection and
treatment of attorneys with mental or other disabilities.
Disability hearings, therefore, seek to remove attorneys with disabilities, mental
or otherwise, thereby preventing them from being able to competently practice law,
from active status until the disability no longer interferes with the attorney's ability
to practice law. In an effort to prevent abuse, however, most states place restrictions
or qualifications on disability inactive status that may violate the mandates of the
ADA by unreasonably limiting an attorney's opportunity to seek reinstatement 6 '
or by allowing misconduct hearings suspended during the disability period to be
pursued when the attorney seeks reinstatement. As long as these provisions are
in place, the potential of penalizing or unfairly treating an individual with a
disability exists. These concerns may be addressed as follows.
First, a better solution to the reinstatement dilemma is to place reasonable
restrictions on the number of times per year an attorney may seek reinstatement.
This would allow attorneys such as Busch, who discover they have a mental
disability and promptly seek help for the disability, to reenter the profession in an
expeditious manner. A good benchmark might be to allow an attorney to file for
reinstatement as often as the state offers the bar examination. 63 This would allow
an attorney on the disability inactive rolls a reasonable number of opportunities per
year to seek reinstatement, but would sufficiently regulate the system so as to
prevent potential abuse. This would allow an attorney who is on the disability
inactive status to undergo up to six months of treatment and therapy. The result
might be a more stable attorney who is better prepared to cope with his disability
in the profession.
Second, courts should not punish persons whose conduct is caused by their
disability in disciplinary proceedings for that conduct. Discipline is designed to
protect "the integrity of the bar and [to promote] the public's confidence in the
state's many attorneys."" A policy that punishes attorneys for misconduct that
arose from a disability now under control, cured, or in remission does not serve
either interest. If the attorney has sought proper treatment and been ruled competent
to practice law, then the attorney does not threaten the integrity of the bar.
Supporting programs that seek to help members with mental disabilities get the
treatment they need can only strengthen the bar. Courts threaten the integrity of the
bar, however, when their rulings tacitly support blatantly discriminatory practices
including punishing individuals for no other purpose than the "dignity" of the
bar.
165
lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate professional authority.").
161. See, e.g., HAW. R. Sup. Cr. 2.19(0 (Hawaiian disability inactive rule allowing one petition for
reactivation per year).
162. See, e.g., 5 OKLA. STAT. ch. 1, app. 1-A, Rule 10.4 (Supp. 1996).
163. Generally twice per year. See, e.g., 5 OKLA. STAT. § 16 (1991).
164. State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Busch, 919 P.2d 1114, 1120 (Okla. 1996).
165. See generally Mary Elizabeth Cisneros, Note, A Proposal to Eliminate Broad Mental Health
Inquiries on Bar Examination Applications: Assessing an Applicant's Fitness to Practice Law by
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A disability inactive system also protects the public confidence in the bar because
it monitors attorney conduct. Attorneys suffer a much higher rate of mental illness
than the general population.1" The alcoholism and drug abuse rates for profes-
sionals including attorneys are as much as three times higher than that of the
general population."6 A system that seeks to intervene and get treatment for
attorneys suffering from these problems while insulating them from disciplinary
action resulting from their problems is more likely to succeed in promoting quality
legal assistance to the public than one that encourages attorneys to hide their
problems and avoid treatment.
Additionally, the public is already protected from attorneys who misappropriate
funds or whose actions cause their clients financial damage. An attorney who steals
or otherwise misappropriates his client's funds may be criminally prosecuted. A
successful prosecution will serve to protect the public by incarcerating the attorney
and will act as a deterrent to other attorneys who may consider such actions.
Additionally, a client may sue the attorney in malpractice for his damages.
Collection may be difficult; however, the client may be able to recover more if
courts have allowed the mentally disabled attorney to get help for his condition and
resume practice because the attorney's income level is likely to be higher as a
lawyer than in other professions. In any event, the client is no worse off under a
disability inactive system than under any of the current systems.
Finally, a disability inactive system protects the public. This system forces
attorneys with mental disabilities, who face disciplinary action, to get treatment
before resuming the practice of law. The current system may suspend an attorney
for a period of time, but the attorney may resume practice regardless of the
attorney's long-term mental health needs. The current system has no long-term
program to monitor and help attorneys with their problems; it merely waits until the
problems have escalated to the point of malpractice and then punishes an attorney
who, had help been available previously, may have avoided committing malpractice.
IV. Conclusion
Mental illness and attorney discipline actions are an uncomfortable reality in the
legal profession. Until recently, the profession has preferred to ignore the possibility
of rehabilitation for mentally ill attorneys. Instead, courts have drummed them out
of the profession. This does not act to help the client, the lawyer, or the legal
profession as a whole. Instead, it perpetuates the problem.
This type of discrimination is exactly the type addressed by the Americans with
Disabilities Act. A system that incorporates attorney monitoring and disability
Alternative Means, 8 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHics 401, 412-15 (1995) (pointing out tendency of bar
associations to discriminate against socially powerless groups, such as women and minorities, in the
past).
166. See generally G. Andrew H. Benjamin et al., The Prevalence of Depression, Alcohol Abuse,
and Cocaine Abuse Among United States Lawyers, 13 lNTL J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 233 (1990).
167. See Michael A. Bloom & Carol Lynn Wallinger, Lawyers and Alcoholism: Is It Time for a New
Approach?, 61 TEMP. L REv. 1409, 1413 (1988).
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inactive status will address these issues in a healthy and positive manner. A system
incorporating these policies will also fall within the guidelines established by the
ADA.
On April 8, 1996, attorneys for Michael Busch filed a Motion for Rehearing with
the Oklahoma Supreme Court."6 The brief pointed out the problems that exist in
reconciling the mandates of the ADA with the court's decision of March 12, 1996.
The court refused to reconsider its decision and denied the motion on May 7,
1996.'9
On July 16, 1996, the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed its decision in the
Busch case. In State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Prather,' the court again
refused to consider an attorney's disability as anything more than a "mitigating
factor" in determining disciplinary measures . 7 ' The trial panel of the Oklahoma
Bar Association" found that Prather had committed misconduct by neglecting one
of his clients." The majority of the misconduct occurred in 1992 and 1993.174
In March 1995, Prather was diagnosed with ADD; since May 1995, Prather has
successfully treated his disability with medication. 75 The court publicly censured
Prather and required him to submit himself to supervision in his law practice. 76
Although the discipline is much lighter than that imposed on Busch, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court continues to err by refusing to adopt a program to accommodate the
interests of all parties in a fair and nondiscriminatory manner.
Stephen M. Hines
168. See Brief in Support of Respondent's Application for Rehearing and Oral Argument, Oklahoma
Bar Ass'n v. Busch, 919 P.2d 1114, 1120 (Okla. 1996), OBAD No. 1187, SCBD No. 4068 (Apr. 8,
1996).
169. Busch, 919 P.2d at 1114.
170. 925 P.2d 28 (Okla. 1996).
171. See id. at 30.
172. See supra note 62.
173. See Prather, 925 P.2d at 28-29.
174. See id. at 29. Prather's client suffered a substantial amount of property damage in an apartment
fire. Prather filed suit twice; on both occasions, the court dismissed the suit because the defendants were
never properly served. Prather did not inform his client that the suit was dismissed. He also neglected
to return the client's phone calls. The client eventually obtained other counsel, but was unable to pursue
her claim due to the statute of limitations. See id.
Prather admitted violating various Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct by failing to notify the
Oklahoma Bar Association and his client of his new address. Prather's office address changed four times
between January 1994 and January 1996. See id. at 30.
Prather had been reprimanded on several previous occasions for professional misconduct which
included client neglect. See id.
175. See id.
176. See id. at 30-31. The supervision included a quarterly meeting with an attorney of the OBA
General Counsel's choice "to discuss [Prather's] case management and docketing systems." Id. at 31.
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